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except by proof of actual malice. This is the orthodox view. Pophe v.
Hoffman, 21 Ohio App. 454, 153 N.E. 248 (1926); Ely v. Mason,
97 Conn. 38, 115 Ad. 479 (1921). But there is some authority for
saying that a lack of probable cause would defeat the privilege. Holway
v. World Pub. Co., 171 Okla. 306, 44 Pac. (2d) 88I (1935); Hodg-
kins v. Gallager, 122 Me. 112, 119 Ad. 68 (1922).
The manager's statement to the prospective employer was also con-
ditionally privileged. When statements about a servant are volunteered,
courts frequently insist that the defendant, if he is to be privileged,
should have a legal or, at least, a moral duty to speak. Fresh v. Cutter,
73 Md. 87, 2o Atl. 774, 25 Am. St. Rep. 575, IO L.R.A. 67 (1890);
The Norfolk and Washington Steamboat Co. v. Davis, 12 App. D.C.
3o6 (1898). But when the information is given in response to a bona
fide inquiry by some one who has an interest in the subject matter, it is
clear that the occasion is privileged. Doane v. Grew, 220 Mass. 171,
107 N.E. 62o, L.R.A. 1915 C, 774, Ann. Cas. 1917 A, 338 (1915);
Solow v. General Motor Truck Co., 64 F (2d) 105 (1933); Rosen-
baum v. Roche, 46 Tex. Civ. App. 237, 101 S.W. 1164 (1907).
Again malice would rebut the privilege but the court finds no evidence
of that here.
The court's holding that whether the occasion was privileged or
not, when the facts are undisputed as they were here, was a question
for the court, is in fine with the great weight of authority. Mauk v.
Brundage, 68 Ohio St. 89, 67 N.E. 152, 62 L.R.A. 477 (1903);
Stewart v. Riley, 114 W. Va. 578, 172 S.E. 791 (i934); annotation
in 26 A.L.R. 833.
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INHERITANCE OF DESIGNATED HEIR THROUGH DECLARANT
George Crommer, brother of Ida Shaffer Smith, designated as his
heir-at-law Minnie M. Frazee who was the mother of defendants Lu
Ella Banta and La '1 aska Grace. George Crommer and Minnie M.
Frazee died before Ida Shaffer Smith. Delia M. Rogers et al, heirs of
Ida Shaffer Smith, filed a petition in common pleas court seeking the
partition of real estate descending from Ida Shaffer Smith. In a cross
petition, defendants Lu Ella Banta and La Taska Grace allege their
right to part of this estate claiming as heirs of Ida Shaffer Smith. The
common pleas court held that defendants had no such right. The court
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of appeals affirmed this. Rogers et al v. Crommer et al, 24 Ohio L. Abs.
508 (1937).
Since the common law makes no provisions for the adoption of
children or designation of heirs, the decisions are based entirely on statu-
tory law. Power et al v. Hafley et al, 85 Ky. 671, 4 S.W. 683
(1887); Helms v. Elliott, 89 Tenn. 446, 14 S.W. 930 (890); In
re Cadwell's Estate, 26 Wyo. 412, i86 Pac. 499 (i92o). The court
in the principal case assumed throughout that the rules as to adopted
children are applicable to designated heirs. The Ohio statute of desig-
nating an heir, Gen. Code, sec. 10503-12, provides that " * * * the
person thus designated will stand in the same relation, for all purposes, to
such declarant as he or she could, if a child born in lawful wedlock
* * * ." Ohio Gen. Code, sec. 10512-19, the adoption statute, pro-
vides that the child " * * * shall be invested with every legal right,
* * * in respect to * * * the rights of inheritance * * *as if born to
them in lawful wedlock; * * *" That these statutes create the same
rights in the designated heir and adopted chil dis stated in Cochrel, a
Minor v. Robinson et al, 113 Ohio St. 526, 149 N.E. 871 (925);
Davis v. Laws et al, 27 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 193 (1928). The principal
case states that the adopted child may take from the adopting parent but
cannot take through him from the ancestors of such parent. The follow-
ing cases support this statement. Quigley v. Mitchell, 41 Ohio St. 375
(1884); Phillips v. McConica, 59 Ohio St. 1, 69 Am. St. Rep. 753, 51
N.E. 445 (1898); lbright v. .lbright, 1x6 Ohio St. 668, 157 N.E.
760, 5 Ohio L. Abs. 349 (927). This view is upheld by the majority
of American jurisdictions. i R.C.L. 622; Estate of Sunderland, 6o
Iowa 732 (Supplement)., 13 N.W. 655 (1882); Kettell v. Baxter, 50
Misc. (N.Y.) 428, ioo N.Y. 529 (19o6); Merritt v. Morton, 143
Ky. 133, i 3 6 S.W. 133 (i9ii); Moore v. Estate of Moore, 35 Vt. 98
(1862) ; Miller v. Wick, 311 Ill. 269, 142 N.E. 490 (1924). This is
true whether the adopted child is attempting to take from the direct or
from the collateral kin of the adopting parent. Hollencamp v. Greulich,
6 Ohio L. Abs. 566, 27 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 344 (1928). The theory
back of these cases is that a stranger to adoption proceedings who does
not recognize the existence of this artificial relation should not have
his property diverted from the natural course of descent into a foreign
line.
The principal case also contains a dictum that property once vested
in the declarant will flow through the designated heir to his heirs. For
this to be true, the statute of descent and distribution must be interpreted
as applying to designated heirs. In Ohio this statute contains no express
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reference either to adopted children or to designated heirs. Reference is
only to children and lineal descendants. This is true in most jurisdic-
tions. The court concluded that adopted children and designated heirs
are meant to be included in the statute through the use of the doctrine
of pari matera. Laws part materia, or concerning the same subject
matter, are to be construed in reference to each other-Bouvier's Law
Dictionary, p. 2454. The court cited Cochrel v. Robinson, supra, as
authority for interpreting the statute of descent and distribution and the
statute of designation of heir as being pari materia. The use of this doc-
trine is well established. Porter v. Rohrer, 95 Ohio St. 9o , 1 5 N.E.
616 (i916); The Ohio River Power Co. v. City of Steubenville, 99
Ohio St. 421, 124 N.E. 246 (1919) ; Maxfield, Treas. v. Brooks, i1o
Ohio St. 566, 144 N.E. 725 (1924); Chapek v. City of Lakewood,
ii Ohio App. 203, 30 Ohio C.A. 541 (1919). Most jurisdictions
interpret the words children and issue as Ohio does. In the Matter of
the Estate of Newman, 75 Cal. 213, 7 Am. St. Rep. 146, 16 Pac. 887
(1888) ; Power v. Hafley, supra; In re Cadwell's estate, supra; In re
Walworth's Estate, 85 Vt. 322, 82 Adt. 7 (1912). But the holdings
are not entirely uniform. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 64 N.H. 407, 14 Ad.
557 (I888); Stanley v. Chandler et al, 53 Vt. 619 (1881); New
York Life Ins. and Trust Co. v. Viele, 16i N.Y. II, 55 N.E. 311
(i899). The objection that inheritance is diverted into a foreign line,
which is made against inheriting through a declarant, cannot be made
here. There is ample authority to justify the court's dictum. Kroff v.
.dmrhein et al, 94 Ohio St. 282, 114 N.E. 267 (1916); Gray et al v.
Holmes et al, 57 Kan. 217, 45 Pac. 596 (1896); Fiske v. Lawton,
124 Minn. 85, 144 N.W. 455 (1913); Bernero v. Goodwin et al,
267 Mo. 427, 184 S.W. 74 (i916); In re Webb's Estate, 250 Pa.
179, 95 Ad. 419 (915). Both the holding as to inheritance through
the declarant and the dictum as to inheritance from him are well sup-
ported in principle and by the decisions in comparable adoption cases.
JEROME H. BROOKS
EVIDENCE
INFERENCE ON AN INFERENCE
One Hozian, the plaintiff, an employee of the Cleveland Window
Cleaning Company, was injured by a crane while cleaning windows in
the defendant's factory. At the trial the plaintiff testified that he had
noticed a person who he thought was a foreman giving instructions
to the workmen in the factory. The plaintiff's counsel asked Hozian
